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00024/129A 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK A. LANGHEINRICH, 
Appellant-Defendant, 
vs . 
WILSON-DAVIS, & CO., INC., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Respondent-Plaintiff. 
Appeal No. 20171 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT - DEFENDANT 
Appellant-Defendant Frank Langheinrich ("Langheinrich"), an 
individual, files this Reply Brief to Respondent-Plaintiff's 
Brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In its brief, respondent-plaintiff, Wilson-Davis & Co., 
Inc., (''Wilson"), a Utah Corporation, recites facts pertaining 
to the signing of a check drawn on the account of Langheinrich & 
Fender, Inc. ("L&F") payable to Wilson and signed by 
Langheinrich, as the only material facts. Wilson claims that 
all other facts are immaterial. 
Langheinrich's brief previously outlined two separate sets 
of facts which provide a basis for defenses tp the claim Wilson 
asserts. See Langheinrich Brief pp. 3-5. 
First, L&F and Wilson were both Salt Lake based securities 
broker-dealers and over the years had engaged in hundreds of 
securities transactions. When L&F encountered financial 
-1-
difficulties partly because its bank withdrew the line of 
credit, Langheinrich signed a check as an authorized 
representative for L&F, payable to Wilson, in the amount of 
$2,764.00. Later the check failed to clear. Wilson stopped 
payment on two checks made payable to L&F which checks totalled 
$11,425.00. 
Second, both L&F and Wilson were members of the Pacific 
Stock Exchange ("Exchange"). After L&F's financial difficulties 
the Exchange sold the seat on the Exchange used by L&F for 
$30,000. Article VII, Section 4 of the Exchange's Constitution 
allows members to make claims against the proceeds. Wilson made 
no claim. 
The foregoing facts relating to the defenses are 
uncontested. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court improperly granted summary judgment to 
Wilson because Langheinrich had established issues of fact 
pertaining to defenses Langheinrich had properly asserted. The 
defenses must be considered. The court erred by granting 
summary judgment in spite of the defenses raised. Contrary to 
Wilson's claim, the defenses are valid. 
Section 7-15-1 making the signor personally liable is 
unconstitutional. The section creates an irrebutable 
presumption which is contrary to provable facts. This renders 
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the statute violative of due process and is therefore 
unconstitutional. 
Section 7-15-1 was enacted by the legislation in 
contravention of Article 6, Section 22 of th^ Utah Constitution. 
The title of the bill did not give fair notice that a signor of 
a check was deemed to be liable for the face amount of a check 
in that the statute was enacted under a bill pertaining to 
financial institutions. Section 7-15-1 is n<it germane to 
financial institutions. The notice was inadequate under the 
Utah Constitution and Utah cases interpreting the relevant 
section. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN LANGHEINRICH EJLEAD AND 
BY AFFIDAVIT RAISED DEFENSES WHICH 
ESTABLISHED QUESTIONS OF FACT|. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that 
if there is no genuine issue of material fact, the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The granting of summary judgment is a harsh remedy because 
it precludes a party from having his own case heard in court. In 
Brandt v. Springville Banking Company, 10 Utah 2d 350, 353 P.2d 
460 (1960) this court stated: 
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We are cognizant of the desirability of permitting 
litigants to fully present their case to the court and 
that summary judgment prevents this. For this reason 
courts are and should be, reluctant to invoke this 
remedy. 
Also, a granting of summary judgment should be rendered only 
after the court has reviewed the record and the evidence and 
every inference based on the evidence should be construed in the 
light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment 
is sought. Frisbee v. K & K Construction Company, 655 P.2d 391 
(Utah 1984), Thompson v. Ford Motor Company, 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 
P.2d 62 (1964), Brandt, supra; Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 
Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297 (1953); Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 
1332. 
In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must 
also consider the facts pertaining to any defenses to the 
summary judgment. See Moore Federal Practice (2d ed.) paragraph 
56.17 (14) p. 56-735 and Langheinrich's Brief p. 6. 
Wilson does not dispute this legal principle. Instead 
Wilson argues that Langheinrich bears the burden of showing a 
material fact exists. (Wilson's Brief, pp. 4 and 5.) Wilson 
further argues that Section 7-15-1 of the Utah Code applies to 
Langheinrich and that the defenses raised lack merit. See 
Wilson's Brief pp. 6-10* 
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Wilson's argument that the defenses lack merit is a tacit 
admission that summary judgment should not hkve been granted. 
When it becomes necessary for a court to consider whether a 
defense may be applicable, summary judgment Should not be 
-, 1 granted. By granting summary judgment, the lower court 
precluded Langheinrich from presenting and fiilly developing the 
facts surrounding Wilson's checks to L&F on Which payment was 
stopped and the failure of Wilson to make a cflaim to the 
Exchange against the proceeds of the sale of the Exchange seat 
of L&F. Further, the court never made findings and never ruled 
on the defenses except to grant Wilson's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The trial court never applied lega|l principles to the 
defenses Langheinrich raised. The defenses a^ id the facts 
supporting them are issues which remain unresolved and 
consequently bar the entry of summary judgment. 
Wilson, through its appeal brief, argues ihat the defenses 
do not apply. First, Wilson argues that estoppel was 
inapplicable to the present case on the basis that Langheinrich 
did not rely to his detriment on any actions 4f Wilson. In the 
context of the estoppel defenses, L&F had issued checks to 
Wilson and Wilson later issued checks to L&F. Subsequently, the 
L&F check was not paid and Wilson stopped payment on two checks 
The record is void of any countervailing factte to the two sets 
of facts which Langheinrich claims constitute defenses to the 
summary judgment. 
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to L&F for $11,425. (R. 145 and 138) Presently, Wilson stands 
to have the benefit of stopping payment on the checks and 
simultaneously collecting on the L&F check from Langheinrich, a 
third party. This is clearly an unconscionable and inequitable 
result which frustrates justice. 
Under the facts of this case Langheinrich may sustain the 
defense of estoppel. As a starting point, L&F and Wilson had 
numerous mutual transactions over time.(R. 136) Second, Wilson, 
through its claim, seeks to make Langheinrich, a third party, 
vicariously liable for the obligation of L&F. Therefore, 
Langheinrich has the right to assert any defense against Wilson 
that L&F could assert because Langheinrich is forced to stand in 
the place of L&F. At the time the L&F check was written, L&F 
had the right to rely that if the check was not paid, Wilson 
would not attempt to collect on the L&F check when Wilson had 
2 
stopped payment on its checks co L&F. Wilson's course of 
conduct provides it with a windfall. 
The doctrine of estoppal is premised upon justice and 
fairness. Its primary purpose is to cause equitable results in 
Langheinrich may also have an offset against Wilson. If 
Langheinrich has the liability of L&F, it is a concomitant that 
Langheinrich should also have any claims L&F may have against 
Wilson. 
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the adminstration of justice. See Johnson V| Neel 229 P.2d 939 
(Colo, 1951) and Scott County, Ark, v. Advance Rumky Thresher 
Co. 288 F. 739r at 750 (8th Cir.). 
Wilson further argues that its conduct d0es not constitute 
waiver. See Wilson's Brief pp. 8 and 9. Wilson's argument is 
based on the assertion that there was no intentional 
relinquishment of Wilson's right under Section 7-15-1 of the 
Utah Code. Wilson's argument attempts to construe the 
underlying facts extremely narrowly and to ignore Wilson's 
failure to have its claim against L&F satisfied from the 
proceeds of the sale of L&F's seat on the Exchange. Wilson's 
argument is faulty. 
The fundamental facts are that L&F, the corporation, not 
Langheinrich, was the maker and issuer of the check for $2,764; 
that Wilson was dealing with L&F? and that Wilson did not expect 
payment from Langheinrich. See Sections 70A3h401 and 403 of the 
Utah Code which Sections are part of the Unifbrm Commercial 
Code. Wilson's claim under the check is firs^ : against L&F. 
Wilson's duty is to conduct itself reasonably and make every 
effort to seek compensation from L&F. Wilson|, as a member of 
the Exchange, was on constructive, if not actual, notice of the 
provision of the Exchange's Constitution alloying for 
intermember claims to be satisfied from the proceeds of the sale 
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of a memberfs seat. (See Section 4 of Article VII.) Wilson 
made no effort to satisfy its claim against L&F under the 
provisions of the Exchange Constitution. 
Wilson's course of conduct clearly fails within the 
definition of waiver. Wilson has cited the defenition in its 
brief at pp. 8 and 9 as: 
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known 
right and there must be an existing right, benefit or 
advantage, knowledge of its existence, and an intention 
to relinquish it and it must be distinctly made, 
although it may be expressed or implied. [Citations 
omitted.) 
Wilson's waiver of its claims by refusing to act can clearly be 
implied from the facts Langheinrich presented to the lower 
court. Once Wilson has waived its claim against the primary 
obligor, L&F, it may not now assert its claim against 
Langheinrich who is allegedly liable vicariously under Section 
7-15-1. 
Even if the court determines that waiver is not applicable, 
Langheinrich has previously raised the defense of Wilson's 
failure to mitigate its damages by failing to make a timely 
claim to the Exchange. See Langheinrich Brief, pp. 4 and 8 and 
Langheinrich's answer. 
If it is assumed that Langheinrich's contention is correct 
and that Wilson could have easily satisfied its claim, it is 
error for the trial court to grant summary judgment because of 
Wilson's failure to mitigate damages. Further, if the facts 
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regarding Wilson's failure to make a claim against the proceeds 
from the sale of the Exchange seat are considered in the light 
most favorable to Langheinrich, the trial coijirt was in error in 
granting summary judgment. It is black letter law that one who 
has a claim against another has a duty to mitigate damages. 
II. 
SECTION 7-15-1 OF THE UTAH Cd>DE 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECUASE IT CREATES Atjl IRREBUTTABLE 
PRESUMPTION WHICH IS IRRATIONAL, ARBITRARY OR 
UNREASONABLE AND ABRIDGES A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
OF LANGHEINRICH. 
Langheinrich has asserted that Section 7-^ 15-1 of the Utah 
Code is unconstitutional becuase it creates dn irrebuttable 
presumption which is irrational, arbitrary ai^ d unreasonable in 
that the assumed facts fail to comport with provable facts. 
Section 7-15-1 precludes a signor of checks from making any 
defense and causes a signor to be liable regardless of any 
attendant circumstances or condition. In thijs matter, 
Langheinrich stands to be deprived of a substantial sum of money 
without having an opportunity to set forth any defenses. The 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibit 
statutes based on irrebuttable presumptions w^ ien the facts may 
prove otherwise. The Fourteenth Amendment in pertinent part 
states: 
No State shall make or enforce any l^ w which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities] of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law . . . 
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Wilson argues that Section 7-15-1 is a strict liability 
statute and that therefore the cases which Langheinrich cites 
regarding irrebuttable presumptions are inapplicable. Wilson 
also argues that the legislature has the prerogative to make an 
"issuer" strictly liable. See Wilson's Brief pp. 10-13. 
Statutes creating irrebuttable presumptions and strict 
liability are very similar. Consequently, the cases cited in 
Langheinrich1s brief at pp. 11 and 12 are applicable. It is 
unlikely that a strict liability statute would be upheld if 
based on a false presumption. 
Wilson further argues that this court should not substitute 
its judgment for the judgment of the legislature by quoting from 
the Bastian v. King 661 P.2d 953 (Utah 1983). (Wilson's Brief 
pp. 11 and 12). In the instant matter, Langheinrich is not 
asking this court to substitute its judgment for the judgment of 
the legislature. Instead Langheinrich has challenged the 
constitutionality of the statute because it is based on faulty 
presumptions, namely that the signor of the check knows whether 
there are funds to cover the check when written and that the 
payee on the check expected the signor to be responsible for the 
amount of the check. If provable facts differ from the 
irrebuttable presumption, the statute is unconstitutional. In 
Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School District, 507 F. 2d 
611 (5th Cir. 1975) at 614, the Court stated: 
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The law is clear that due process interdicts the 
adoption by a state of an irrebuttable presumption as 
to which the presumed fact does not 
from the proven facts. 
necessarily follow 
This is applicable to the instant matter. 
Wilson also argues that Langheinrich was the issuer of the 
check and that therefore he bears the risks 4s an issuer. 
(Wilson Brief p. 12) As previously cited uncjer the Uniform 
Commercial Code at Section 70A3-401 and 403f |Mr. Langheinrich 
was not the issuer of the check. He merely s|igned the check 
drawn on the account of L&F in a representative capacity and 
therefore is not liable as an issuer. If Wilson hinges its 
arguments on Langheinrich being the issuer of the check, that 
argument fails because Langheinrich signed th^ check in a 
3 
representative capacity. 
Finally Wilson argues that Langheinrich l^cks standing to 
argue that corporate agents should not be personally liable on 
checks signed on behalf of the corporation, ^ilson's standing 
argument raises the question as to the capacity in which 
Langheinrich signed the check. For the reasons already given, 
Langheinrich must be accorded the status of a corporate agent. 
3 
The capacity in which Langheinrich signed th^ check under 
Sections 3-401 and 403 is an issue which the llower court never 
addressed nor decided. 
-11-
The fact that Langheinrich was also an onficer and director of 
the corporation does not affect his status as an age it. The 
unfairness of making a corporate agent liable for the obligation 
of the corporation is equally applicable to Mr. Langheinrich as 
a "hapless employee who has been unfairly surprised by the 
prospect of personal liability for the bad check." (Wilson's 
Brief p. 13). Wilson's argument of the "hapless employee" 
virtually concedes the inequity and unfairness of Section 
7-15-1. 
III. 
SECTION 7 - 1 5 - 1 WHEINl ENACTED VIOLATED THE 
PROVISIONS OF SECTION 22 OF ARTICLE 6 OF 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Langheinrich contends that under Section 22, Article 6, Utah 
Constitution, the enactment of Section 7-15-1 of the Utah Code 
is invalid because the title of the bill failed to give adequate 
notice to the legislature regarding the full intent and 
ramifications of the bill. Section 22 of Article 6 states: "No 
bill shall be passed containing ,nore than one subject which 
shall be clearly expressed in its title." It is a 
constitutional requirement that when enacting statutes, the 
legislature has a duty to provide notice to its members of the 
subject matter of the legislation. 
Wilson argues correctly that the title of the bill enacting 
Section 7-15-1 was "Financial Institutions Act of 198x". Wilson 
argues that under McQuire v. University of Utah Mecucal Center 
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603 P.2d 786, and Edler v. Edwards 34 Utah 1$, 95 P. 367 (1908), 
all that is necessary is to specify the section being amended. 
Langheinrich argues that this is not sufficient, McQuire 
requires that the matters enacted be germane to the Title and 
that fair notice be given. Section 7-15-1 w^s amended to make 
the signer of a check personally liable and precludes him from 
offering any defense related to the signing. Second, making the 
signor of a check liable has little if anything to do with the 
financial institutions of the State of Utah. The signor of the 
check is not liable to any financial institution unless the 
check is written to that institution. The only role of the 
financial institution is its performance as ^ art of the banking 
process. Third, the amendment was a sweeping change from the 
former Section 7-15-1 which had a provision requiring that 
fraudulent intent be shown on the part of a signor. For those 
reasons, merely stating the Section to be amended is 
insufficient. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court acted improperly in granting Wilson's 
Motion for Summary Judgment when Langheinrich had not only plead 
defenses but by affidavit had set forth two sbts of facts which 
constitute viable, sustainable defenses to Wilson's claim. 
Second, Section 7-15-1 of the Utah Code is unconstitutional 
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because it is premised on a presumption that fails to comport 
with the provable facts. Further, Section 7-15-1 was improperly 
enacted in that the requirements of Article 6# Section 22 were 
not met. 
This court should either remand the case to the District 
Court after reversing the Order granting summary judgment or, in 
the alternative, this court should dismiss plaintiff's Complaint 
because it is based on an unconstitutional statute. 
Dated this ^h day of March, 1985. 
Respectfully submitted, 
tUaJ^JAu, x>* tj^^u^ 
Wallace T. Boyack 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
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foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant-Defendant, U.S. Mails, 
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Thomas B. Green 
Mark E. Wilkey 
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164 1-81 Transfer of Membership 1061 
% 1411 Effective Date 
SEC 3 Admission to membership shall become effective on the tenth day 
following the prescribed posting of said application, unless during the ten-dav posting 
period as a result of information submitted concerning the applicant three or more 
Governors shall disapprove the application 
1)1416 Sign Constitution 
Stc 4 No member shall be admitted to the privileges of membership until he 
shall have signed the Constitution of the Exehange, and b\ such signature pledge 
himself and any member firm he may then or subsequentK represent to abide bv the 
Constitution of the Exchange and all rules and regulations adopted pursuant thereto as 
the same now exist or may hereafter be amended, revised or supplemented 
H 1421 Treasury Membership 
SEC 5 An applicant pmchasing a Treasurv membership shall deposit th< pnee 
fixed by the Board of Governors for such membership together with the initial Ice 
11 1426 No Liability for Using Facilities 
S*c 6 The Exchange shall not be liable for any damiges sustained bv a member 
or his firm growing out of the us* or emplovment by such member or his firm e)f the 
facilities afforded by the Exchange to members in the conduct of their business The 
member and his member firm expressh agree in consideration of his admissiem to 
membership to release and discharge the Exchange, each of its members, Governors 
officers, agents and emplovees of and from all claims or damages arising from the 
execution of said Constitution and rules and regulations adopted pursuant therein 
ARTICLE VII 
TRANSFER OF MEMBERSHIP 
11 1451 Transfer 
Si-c 1 Membership in the Exchange ma> be transferred bv a member onlv in 
aeeordance with the provisions of this Article VII and onlv to a person whose 
application and election becomes etlee live under Artiele \ I 
I 1456 Fees 
Sf-c 2 An application for transfer of membership shall be accompanied bv such 
fees as shall be dete rmmed bv the Roan I ot Governors 
II 1461 Settlement of Contracts 
Si e 3(a) The member pioposmg to transfer his membership shall not after 
settlement date fixed by tin Boaul ot Governors make any comiacts on the Exchange 
except contracts expressly mule on be lulf of another member of the Fxehange 
1)1466 Contracts Mature 
Sic 3(b) On the settlement date all member contracts of the member pioposmg 
to make such transfer, or of his turn shall mature and if not settled shall be closed out 
as in the case of insolvency unless the same are assumed or taken over bv another 
member of the Exe hangc 
H 1471 Payment Purchase Price 
SLC 4 At least four davs prior to the effective date 6f admission to membership 
of the transferee, any purchase price being paid for such transfer shall be paid to the 
Exchange The only claim of the transferor to such purchase price shall be to any 
Pacific Stock Exchange Guide A r t i c l e V I I 1 1 1 4 7 1 
019 I I 
CONST I ~i u T/UA/ 
1062 Constitution 1M ^\ 
surplus remaining after the application of such purchase price to the following 
purposes and in the following order ot priority. 
(a) The full payment of all dues, icts, charges, fines and contributions 
assessable against said membership or payable by the transferor or his member 
firm to the Exchange and to the Pacific Clearing Corporation 
(b) The payment to members or member firms of all filed claims arising from 
member contracts if and to the extent that the same shall be determined by the 
Board of Governors to have arisen out of contracts had between the parties 
thereto in the ordinary course ot business and shall not have been disallowed by 
the Board of Governors 
(c) The payment of all member contracts that are made subject to the rules 
of another exchange, provided that such claim shall have been allowed hv the 
Board of Governors 
% 1476 Claim Unascertained 
SF.C. 5. If a claim based on a contract is unascertained, the Board of Governors 
may reserve and retain out of the pun hase price such an amount as it may deem 
appropriate pending the determination of the amount due on such claim A claim shall 
be allowed by the Board of Governors only for the amount due thereon after crediting 
the fair value of any collateral securing such claim. If the purchase price is insufficient 
to pay all of the claims arising out of contracts allowed by the Board of Governors, sud 
claims shall be paid pro rata The surplus, if any, of the purchase price shall be paid to 
the transferor, or his h gal repiesentanve, upon the execution of releases satisfactory to 
the Board of Governors. 
111481 File Statement 
S Kr^Jju-A • ixiembiX-M mem her hrm shall forfeit any elaim_ under Sec 4 of (his 
ATucIe^VIX to share injhe purcTfase p r u ^ ^ t T n ^ ^ O T j e s s a stafemenXoT^UTh rtrnrn 
7s"filed with the Exchange prtofT^ of the transfer. If sucfl statement 
of claim is not so filed, the claim may still be" allowed by "the Hoard of Governors and 
paid out of any surplus after all other claims allowed by the Board of Governors have 
been paid in full, and may be paid in preference to claims referred to in Sec 7 uf this 
Article VII. 
11 1486 Claim Between Member, His Partners, Etc. 
SKC. 7. Claims arising out of transactions between the member and his partners, 
or associated stockholders, who are members of the Exchange, shall not share in the 
purchase price until after all other claims, as allowed by the Board of Governors, have 
been paid in full. 
H 1491 Deceased Member Whose Membership Purchased With Firm's Funds 
SEC. 8(a). Upon the death of a member whose membership was purchased from 
funds advanced by his member firm, such membership shall be transferred to a 
surviving allied member of such member firm, or to an officer and director of >uch 
member firm under the provisions of Sec. 1(f) of Article VIII, or a quahiied nominee 
under the provisions of Sec. 2(a) of Article VIII, provided in any case such transferee is 
elected to membership under Article VI. The Board of Governors may require as a 
condition of transfer payment to the Exchange of funds sufficient to pay priority 
claims as set forth in Sec 4 of this Article VII. 
1 1501 Membership Not Purchased With Firm's Funds 
SKC. 8(b). Upon the death of a member whose membership was purchased 
otherwise than by funds advanced by his member firm, such membership shall be 
transferred in accordantt with any agreement between such deceased member and his 
member firm, provided such agreement had previously been filed with the Exchange 
1f 1471 Article VII <ol981, Commerce Clearing House, in_ 
[27] BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS Ch. 16 
(1) Each lender requiring the establishment or continuance of a reserve 
account in connection with an existing or future real estate loan shall pay 
interest on funds deposited in the account [af^ er June 30, 1979] of at least 
[4%) 5 1/4% simple interest per annum, unless: 
(a) The reserve account is required by a governmental insurer or guaran-
tor of the loan as a condition of insurance or guaranty; 
(b) The reserve account is maintained in 
in an original principal amount exceeding 80% 
of the property at the time the loan is made provided 
M 
connection with a real estate loan 
the lender's appraised value 
that when the principal 
balance of the loan is paid down to 80% this exception shall not apply; or 
(c) The payment of interest or other compensation to the borrower for the 
use of funds deposited in a reserve account is| prohibited by federal law or 
regulations. 
(2) The interest shall be computed as of the end of the calendar year on 
the average of the month end balances in the account for that calendar year 
or partial calendar year, except that in the event of payoff of the real estate 
loan, interest shall be computed on the average month end balances in the 
account for the partial year ending at the end of the month preceding payoff. 
The interest shall, within 60 days after the end of each calendar year, at the 
election of the lender, be credited to the remaining principal balance on the 
loan, paid to the borrower, his successors or assigns, or credited to the 
reserve account, except that in the event of payoff of the real estate loan, the 
interest shall be paid or credited to the borrower, his successors or assigns 
within 30 days after the date of payoff. 
(3) No lender shall require or impose a service charge for the administra-
tion of a reserve account. 
(4) Except as provided in this section, no lender shall be obligated to 
pay interest on or account for the earnings from funds in any reserve account 
in connection with the real estate loan made or held after June 30, 1979, 
unless an agreement in writing expressly so providing was executed by the 
borrower and lender. 
Approved March 23, 1981. 
CHAPTER 16 
S B No 134 (Passed Marcjh 12. 1981 In effect July 1. 1981 ) 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ACT OF 1981 
AN ACT RELATING TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
POWERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL 
VIOUSLY UNREGULATED FINANCIAL SERVICES 
TION BY THE DEPARTMENT; LIMITING THE JURISDICTION 
TO PREVENT OVERLAPPING AND DUPLICATING 
CHARTERED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THE SAME 
GRESS HAS GRANTED FEDERALLY CHARTERED 
RECIPROCITY WITH REGARD TO THE ENTRY 
TIONS, SUBJECT TO A SHOWING OF PUBLIC NEtED 
CLARIFYING SUPERVISORY 
INSTITUTIONS; SUBJECTING PRE-
TO SUPERVISION AND REGULA-
OF THE DEPARTMENT 
REGULATION; GRANTING STATE 
OPERATING POWERS AS CON-
INSTITUTIONS; PROVIDING FOR 
FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITU-
REPEALING CERTAIN CHAP-
QF 
Ch. 16 BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS [28] 
TERS OF TITLE 7 RUT FORMERLY GOVERNED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND 
PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE. 
THIS ACT REPEALS CHAPTERS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 8a, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, AND 18 OF TITLE 
7, AND SECTION 78-12-34, LTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AND ENACTS CHAPTERS 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 8a, 9, 11, 14, AND 15 OF TITLE 7, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah 
Section 1. Chapters repealed. 
Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 8a, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, and 18 of Titk 7, and 
Section 78-12-34, Utah Code Annotated 1953, are repealed 
Section 2. Chapter enacted. 
Chapter 1 of Title 7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to reaj 
ARTICLE 1 
7-1-101. Citation of act. 
This act shall be known and mav be cited as the ''Financial Institutions 
Act of 1981/' 
7-1-102. Legislative findings and intent—Purposes of act. 
The legislature finds that it is in the public interest to strengthen the regu-
lation, supervision, and examination of persons, firms, corporations, associa-
tions, and other business entities furnishing financial services to the people of 
this state or owning and controlling those businesses The legislature further 
finds that there have been substantial changes in the structure of the f nancial 
services industry and the nature and characteristics of the institutions and 
other business entities furnishing those services Accordingly, it is the purpose 
of this act to expand and strengthen the duties, powers, and responsibilities of 
the state department of financial institutions and to place under its jurisdic-
tion all classes of institutions and other businesses engaged in furnishing 
financial services to the people of this state or owning and controlling those 
businesses The legislature further finds that there has been a trend toward 
the expansion of the powers and functions of federally chartered or insured 
financial institutions to the competitive disadvantage of institutions chartered 
under the laws of this state Accordingly, it is the further purpose of this act 
to grant powers, privileges, and immunities to state chartered institutions at 
least equal to those possessed b> federallv chartered or insured institutions of 
the same class furnishing financial services to the people of this state in order 
to promote competitive equality in the financial services industry in this state 
and to protect the interests of shareholders, members, depositors, and other 
customers of state chartered institutions 
The legislature further finds that the commissioner of financial institutions, 
under section 5 oi chapter 4, Laws of Utah 1980, has recommended in order 
to protect the depositors, customers, and shareholders of depository institu-
tion^ having their principal place of business in this state and in the interest of 
the general public and the economy of this state, that the state department of 
financial institutions be empowered to regulate the establishment in this state 
of offices of foreign depository institutions as defined in that legislation and 
